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Articles
JUDICIAL INCENTIVES AND THE
APPEALS PROCESS
Christopher R. Drahozal*
LL, or virtually all, court systems have some sort of appeals pro-A cess whereby litigants that are dissatisfied with an initial decision
can challenge that decision "on appeal." The federal court sys-
tem in the United States, for example, has three tiers of adjudicators: an
initial decision-maker (a United States district court), which finds facts as
well as decides questions of law; and two tiers of appellate review (a
United States court of appeals and the United States Supreme Court),
which decide questions of law and engage in very limited review of fact
finding.1 The court systems of other countries likewise commonly pro-
vide for an initial decision-maker subject to some form of appellate re-
view.2 The widespread availability of an appeals process in court
adjudication contrasts sharply with the lack of an appeals process in com-
mercial arbitration, where a party has essentially no ability to appeal an
adverse award.3
The literature identifies two principal functions served by an appeals
process. The first function of an appeals process is to correct errors by
the initial decision-maker. Trial courts make mistakes, and appellate
courts, because of their greater expertise, lesser time pressures, collegial
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. I appreciate the helpful com-
ments of Henry Butler, Elizabeth Garrett, Rick Levy, Steve McAllister, Sid Shapiro, and
the participants at the Ninth John M. Olin Annual Conference in Law and Economics of
the Canadian Law and Economics Association, September 27, 1997. 1 also wish to thank
Carrie Josserand and Kevin Robb for their excellent research assistance. This research was
supported by the University of Kansas General Research Fund.
1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41, 44, 132-133 (1994); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 2-4 (5th ed. 1994). This description oversimplifies somewhat by
not including bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges, whose decisions also are subject to
appellate review.
2. See, e.g., PETER McCORMICK, CANADA'S COURTS 23-33 (1994). See generally Pe-
ter E. Herzog & Delmar Karlen, Attacks on Judicial Decisions § 8-9, in 16 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1982).
3. See Pieter Sanders, Arbitration § 12-224, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1996); GABRIEL M. WIL-
NER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 32.02 (rev. ed. 1990) (noting exceptions).
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decision-making, or some other reason, correct those mistakes.4 Steven
Shavell has argued that an appeals process for correcting errors is supe-
rior to the alternative of improving the quality of trial courts to prevent
errors, because it requires the expenditure of resources only in cases in
which the party bringing the appeal has determined that trial court error
was likely.5 "The appeals process," according to Shavell, "may allow so-
ciety to harness information that litigants have about erroneous decisions
and thereby to reduce the incidence of mistake at low cost."'6
The second function attributed to the appeals process is lawmaking. At
least in common law countries, appellate judges decide cases that provide
precedents to guide decisions in future cases. The highest appellate court
ensures that the law created by the courts is uniform. 7 William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner have argued that the lack of an appeals
process in commercial arbitration "suggests that the principal value of
appellate proceedings is not to correct errors at the trial level but to for-
mulate rules of law."'8 They reason that the benefits of lawmaking by
judges are largely external to the parties involved in a particular case;
thus, parties to an arbitration agreement have little incentive to provide
for an appeals process and pay the appeals tribunal to engage in
lawmaking. 9
This Article extends the existing literature by addressing the functions
of an appeals process from the perspective of the incentives of judges
rather than from the perspective of the incentives of litigants. 10 Because
the institutional characteristics of courts at different tiers of the court sys-
tem vary, the incentives of judges at the different tiers vary as well. As a
result, on the margin a judge may decide a case differently depending on
whether the judge sits on a trial court, an intermediate appellate court, or
4. See, e.g., Herzog & Karlen, supra note 2, § 8-4; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL.,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-4 (1976).
5. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 381-82 (1995). Shavell emphasizes that his focus on error correction is
"not to deny the importance of other possible purposes of the appeals process, notably, of
lawmaking." Id. at 381.
6. Id. at 382.
7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 12 (1985)
(hereinafter POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS]; Herzog & Karlen, supra note 2, § 8-7.
8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 252 (1979).
9. See id. at 238. Shavell explains that the lack of appeals in commercial arbitration
as based, not only on the fact that arbitrators do not make "law," but also as a consequence
of the parties' ability to select the arbitrator and an arbitrator's incentive to preserve his
reputation by minimizing errors. See Shavell, supra note 5, at 423-24; see infra text accom-
panying notes 146-50.
10. Shavell addresses judicial incentives to some degree, although the analysis here
differs from his. See Shavell, supra note 5, at 390-91. Judge Posner has dealt with judicial
incentives at length in other contexts, but has dealt with judicial incentives only to a limited
degree in connection with the appeals process. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges
and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1,
14-15 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?]; see also RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.14 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER,




a supreme court. The appeals process requires a rational utility-maximiz-
ing trial judge to take the possibility of review by a decision-maker with
different incentives into account when making his or her initial decision,
thereby constraining the trial judge's decision making.
An approach that focuses on judicial incentives complements and re-
fines the approaches of Shavell and Landes and Posner. Shavell exam-
ines the correction of errors through the appeals process. This Article
explains how the appeals process can prevent errors as well by aligning
the incentives of trial court and appeals court judges. The alignment may
not be exact, however; some "errors" will still occur. Such errors are not
simply mistakes that could be avoided with greater care, but are a func-
tion of the institutional characteristics of the court system. Landes and
Posner conclude that, because of the lack of an appeals process in com-
mercial arbitration, the main purpose of the appeals process is to create
law.11 This Article offers an additional reason for the lack of an appeals
process in arbitration-the differing incentives of arbitrators and judges.
This focus on judicial incentives builds on the growing body of litera-
ture treating judges as rational utility maximizers, which is summarized in
Part I. Judges, particularly judges in an "independent" judiciary such as
those of the United States and Canada, are difficult to fit into traditional
economic and public choice models. Nonetheless, the literature has been
increasingly successful in identifying the preferences of judges in such
things as respect, leisure, discretion, promotion, and the like.
Part II examines how differences in institutional characteristics be-
tween the tiers of the court system affect the incentives of judges. Be-
cause of institutional differences between trial courts and appellate
courts, the incentives of trial court judges differ in a systematic way-with
the trial judge's preferences for leisure and promotion relatively more
important-from the incentives of appeals court judges.
Part III analyzes how the appeals process constrains these differing ju-
dicial incentives. The principal conclusion is that the appeals process al-
ters the incentives of trial court judges by requiring them to include in
their decision-making calculus the likelihood of review by appellate court
judges with differing incentives. The deferential review of trial court fact-
finding by appellate courts plays a key role in this analysis.
Finally, Part IV explains how the lack of an appeals process in commer-
cial arbitration proceedings may be understood, at least in part, as a con-
sequence of the differences between the incentives of arbitrators and
judges. Because arbitrators, unlike judges, have to compete for each new
case, they have an incentive not only to avoid mistakes but to decide
cases so as to maximize the benefit to the parties, thus increasing their
own likelihood of being appointed again as an arbitrator.
Part V summarizes my conclusions.
11. See Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 252.
19981
SMU LAW REVIEW
I. WHAT DO JUDGES MAXIMIZE? 12
Public choice applies the methods of economics to the study of poli-
tics. 1 3 It views government officials as rational actors who maximize their
own utility subject to institutional constraints. 14 Based on this underlying
assumption about human behavior, public choice theorists have made im-
portant contributions towards understanding and predicting political ac-
tivity. Until recently, these contributions have focused largely on the
behavior of the legislative and executive branches of government and the
individuals supporting them.15 Little was said about the judiciary.16
Indeed, Judge Posner has called the difficulty of explaining the behav-
ior of the judiciary in economic terms "a mystery that is also an embar-
rassment. 1 7 Richard Epstein writes of the "meager harvest" likely to
result from such an attempt, at least when directed at judges acting as
judges rather than judges acting as employers, administrators, or the
like. 18 The difficulty is most pronounced when analyzing the behavior of
an independent judiciary, made up of judges who are largely isolated
from the political pressures faced by elected officials and from the market
pressures faced by other economic actors. Federal judges in the United
12. See generally Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10.
Unless the context indicates otherwise, the discussion that follows applies to Supreme
Court Justices as well as to trial and appellate court judges.
13. See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice in Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 1 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
14. See, e.g., ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 4-11, 27-28
(1957); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 17-18 (1962); FRED. S. MCCHESNEY,
MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 144
(1997); Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Pub-
lic Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993, 996-97 (1988). For a
description of the underlying rationality assumption, see Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, The Nature of Man, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4 (1994) (describing "resourceful,
evaluative, maximizing model"). For a brief discussion of the development of variations on
this underlying behavioral assumption, see Mueller, supra note 13, at 15-17.
15. For an excellent overview of the public choice literature, see Mueller, supra note
13.
16. A classic exception is William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). A far older exam-
ple might be Lord Campbell's opinion in Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J. Ex. 308, 313 (H.L. 1856), in
which he explained the common law reluctance to grant specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements as based on the self-interest of the judiciary:
The doctrine had its origins in the interests of the Judges. There was no
disguising the fact that, as formerly, the emoluments of the Judges depended
mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as they had no fixed salary, there
was great competition to get as much as possible of litigation into Westmin-
ster Hall .... And they had great jealously of arbitrations whereby West-
minster Hall was robbed of those cases which came not into Kings Bench,
nor the Common Pleas, nor the Exchequer. Therefore they said that the
Courts ought not to be ousted of their jurisdiction, and that it was contrary to
the policy of the law to do so.
Id. at 313. See the discussion in Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 255-56; see also
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
17. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 2.
18. See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of
Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827.
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States, for example, are appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, with life tenure and a salary secure from legislative reduction. 19
Federal judges cannot rule in cases in which they have a direct financial
interest,20 and their income is essentially unaffected by the number of
cases they decide or the quality of their decisions.21 The difficulty of ap-
plying economic models to individuals who are largely insulated from the
economic and political considerations so familiar to economists seems
obvious.22
This supposed failing of public choice is rapidly being corrected by a
growing body of literature that analyzes judicial behavior from an eco-
nomic perspective. This body of literature develops the likely elements of
19. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. Even the federal judiciary is subject to some checks
by the legislative branch. Congress can decline to give judges raises. See Epstein, supra
note 18, at 834; POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 21. It can reward the
judiciary by giving raises. See Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives of Judges to
Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers, 32 J.L. & ECON. 215, 219-20 (1989). It also controls
court budgets for items other than salary. See Eugenia F. Toma, Congressional Influence
and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 146
(1991). However, Congress's ability to use monetary rewards to influence the judiciary is
limited because all judges on the same court are paid the same. See Epstein, supra note 18,
at 835.
Congress also can legislatively overturn non-constitutional decisions of the courts (and
even constitutional decisions can be overturned by a constitutional amendment). Thus,
Professors Gely and Spiller have argued that "[t]he ability of other political actors to take
actions to reverse the Supreme Court decisions is what constrains the scope and power of
the Court." Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 263, 265 (1990); see also Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial
Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 295 (1996).
This legislative constraint is likely to be of less significance for lower federal courts than it
is for the United States Supreme Court; Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political
Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Pack-
ing Plan, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1992) [hereinafter Gely & Spiller, The Political
Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions]; Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely,
Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court
Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1994).
21. In addition, as Judge Posner points out, judges are discouraged from returning to
private law practice (where their reputation as a judge might significantly increase their
earnings) by the "heavily backloaded" nature of judicial compensation, particularly the
job's "attractive pension arrangements." Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?,
supra note 10, at 5-6.
22. Decision-making by state judges in the United States, many of whom are elected,
presumably would be more amenable to traditional public choice analysis. See, e.g., Har-
old W. Elder, Property Rights Structures and Criminal Courts: An Analysis of State Crimi-
nal Courts, 7 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 21 (1987) (finding a relationship between the system
of judicial selection and the behavior of judges in criminal cases); see also Paul Brace &
Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the American States,
48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 24 (1995) (finding that method of selection and length of tenure affect
judges' votes on use of the death penalty). Even elected judges, however, may retain some
degree of independence. See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospec-
tive Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 969 n.95 (1995); Richard L. Hasen, "High
Court Wrongly Elected:" A Public Choice Model of Judging and Its Implications for the
Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1335 (1997). For descriptions of the varying sys-
tems of judicial selection in the states, see COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK
OF THE STATES 133-5 (1996); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judges
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725-26 (1995).
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a judicial utility function and then treats judges as seeking to maximize
their utility when deciding cases or developing legal doctrine. 23 Although
the precise components of the judicial utility function are subject to some
disagreement, and individual judges may vary widely in their preferences,
the key elements identified in the literature are the following:24
Deciding. Deciding cases is what judges do, and presumably they de-
rive utility from doing so, having given up much more lucrative work to
become a judge. Building on the suggestions of others,2 5 I propose that
judges derive utility in deciding cases from two different, and possibly
conflicting, aspects of the decision process: from the outcome in a partic-
ular case ("ideological utility")2 6 and from following professional norms
of legal reasoning in deciding the case ("reasoning utility").2 7 Some
judges favor expansive federal authority to regulate interstate commerce;
others favor narrower federal authority. Some judges favor defendants in
criminal cases; others favor the prosecution (the so-called "hanging
judge"). Judges derive ideological utility from deciding cases consistently
with these preferences so as "to impose their personal preferences and
values on society."' 28 But many, if not most, cases have little ideological
23. There is certainly no reason to assume that judges are innately non-economic in
their behavior, as illustrated by Richard Epstein's example of federal judges behaving pre-
cisely as predicted by cartel theory (i.e., cheating on the "cartel") in failing to abide by a
self-imposed deadline for hiring law clerks. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 841-44. The
difficulty with applying economic models to judges results from the incentive structures
facing the judges, not with the judges themselves.
24. Judge Posner also includes pecuniary income in his formal specification of the judi-
cial utility function so as to be able to derive predictions about the impact of changes in
judges' income on their behavior. See Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?,
supra note 10, at 31-34.
25. See Cass, supra note 22, at 970-81 (examining "three types of incentives that to-
gether may explain a fair amount of judicial behavior: (1) incentives (such as reputation
among and relations with professionals) to follow professional norms; (2) incentives (such
as maintaining favorable standing with important political actors) to reach particular out-
comes irrespective of their satisfaction of professional norms; and (3) concerns internal to
(or already fully internalized by) the judge"); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Posi-
tive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636-37
(1995) (judges "accord some significant weight to personal views about what the govern-
ment should do and how government officials should do it, and are willing to make com-
promises between judicial and political norms and their personal policy preferences");
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1053-58 (1995) (identifying "two
generally accepted components of judicial decisionmaking:" "craft," meaning "the well-
reasoned application of doctrine to the circumstances of the particular case" and "out-
come," i.e., "focus[ing] on the result in a given case and its implications for the parties and
society as a whole").
26. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 25, at 1054.
27. Compare Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 15-19
(analogizing judges to spectators at a play or voters in a political election and arguing that
judges derive consumption value from the act of voting), with Thomas J. Miceli & Metin
M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, 23 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 49
(1994) (judges trade-off "private utility"-their "personal view of how a case should be
decided"-and "reputational utility"-their "expectation of how [a] decision would be
viewed by observers of the legal process").
28. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 10, § 19.7 at 535. Gely and
Spiller explain that "[i]t is reasonable to expect that both Congress and the President will
prefer the potential justice to have particular, but not necessarily the same, ideological
[Vol. 51
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component.29 In these cases, judges derive reasoning utility by using
standard means of legal reasoning to decide the case in accord with pre-
cedent. 30 The judge's reasoning utility is greater when the judge decides
the case "correctly" given the governing precedent, although presumably
reasoning utility is greater when a judge decides an uncertain issue of law
rather than merely applying clear and long-settled principles.
31
Prestige/Respect. Judges gain prestige simply by being judges. This
type of prestige varies little with how a judge decides a case.32 But judges
also gain respect within the legal community based on how well they ap-
ply professional norms of legal reasoning in deciding cases. Lawyers and,
to a lesser extent, legal academics benefit from the increased predictabil-
ity of the law that results when judges apply professional norms in decid-
ing cases. 33 They will reward judges who behave this way by showing
them greater respect. 34 In addition, judges may gain respect from certain
groups-lawyers, politicians, or others-based on the outcome of a
case.35 This sort of respect would reinforce the judge's ideological utility
and may enhance the judge's chances of promotion as well.
Leisure. Another commonly identified element of the judicial utility
function is leisure. 36 Judges, like the rest of us, value leisure time. As a
preferences, and will reject candidates either with the wrong or extremely erratic prefer-
ences." Gely & Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions,
supra note 19, at 47.
29. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfor-
tunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251, 286-88 (1997).
30. Judge Bork's infamous answer during his confirmation hearings to the question of
why he wanted to be a Supreme Court justice-that "it would be an intellectual feast just
to be there"-provides what may be an extreme example of what I mean by reasoning
utility. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 854
(1987).
31. See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 172 (1994) (courts of appeals judges "are very independent,
highly motivated individual decision-makers who feel a great responsibility to 'get it
right"'). Unlike a crossword puzzle, there may not be a single "correct" decision in a
particular case that can be obtained by applying standard legal reasoning techniques. But
in at least some cases there likely would be a single correct decision, and certainly in many
there are more correct and less correct decisions. Indeed, this follows from the common
argument that legal reasoning norms are valuable because they enhance the stability and
predictability of the law. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
32. See Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 13-14.
33. See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 63, 72 (1994).
34. See Cass, supra note 22, at 971-74. Note that as for procedural rules, the judicial
preference for respect might lead to rules that favor practicing lawyers. See also Jonathan
R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 627, 631 (1994) ("judges' considerable human capital investment in the legal system
is likely to align their preferences with the preferences (and interests) of the legal commu-
nity as a whole. Consequently, judges are likely to view procedural rules that maximize the
demand for lawyers' services as socially desirable, not because of any cynical desire to pad
the pockets of members of the bar, but because of a tendency to see the benefits of proce-
dural rules but not the costs.").
35. See Cass, supra note 22, at 975-77; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 25, at 1057.
36. See GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 123 (1980) ("judges may find a situation
confronting them where a particular decision will greatly reduce their workload; they are
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purely anecdotal example, one of my colleagues tells of a judge he ob-
served repeatedly making problematic, if not incorrect, rulings excluding
evidence from a hearing. The judge eventually informed the parties, in a
moment of perhaps undue candor, that he was to leave on vacation the
following week and that he was not going to let the hearing interfere with
his trip.
At some point, the opportunity cost of foregone leisure exceeds the
benefits to the judge of additional time spent in making decisions. Thus,
one would expect judges to decide at least some cases so as to protect or
increase their leisure time and to be more likely to do so as their caseload
increases. Granting a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judg-
ment avoids a possibly lengthy trial. Rejecting the validity of a questiona-
ble legal theory may reduce the volume of similar cases filed in the
future. Settlements also reduce a judge's caseload and have the added
benefit of generally not being subject to appellate review. Thus, one
would expect judges to adopt procedural rules and to take other steps to
encourage settlement.37 Again, the prediction is that leisure affects judi-
cial decisions on the margin. Not every decision will be an attempt by a
judge to increase his or her leisure.38 But on the margin one would ex-
pect leisure to be relevant.39
Discretion. Judges prefer unconstrained decision making to con-
strained decision-making.40 A judge who merely follows a clear and sim-
ple rule will receive less job satisfaction than a judge who has broad
discretion in how to decide a case. A judge applying a clear rule would
receive little reasoning utility, while a judge exercising broad discretion
will have much room for enhancing his or her ideological utility. Thus, on
the margin one would expect judges to decide legal issues so as to pre-
serve or expand their discretionary decision-making.
Promotion to a Higher Court. Judges have limited incentive to pursue
job opportunities outside of the judiciary because of the back-loaded na-
likely to move toward the lower work load because their pay is not affected by the number
of hours they put in on the job"); Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra
note 10, at 20-22 (identifying various doctrines that reflect the "influence of leisure-seeking
on judicial behavior"); Epstein, supra note 18, at 837-38; see also Lauren K. Robel,
Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REv. 3, 6-11, 38-40.
37. See Macey, supra note 34, at 634-35.
38. In addition, there may be societal benefits from what appears to be leisure-seeking
activity. See, e.g., Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 22-23;
Cass, supra note 22, at 989-94.
39. The discussion in the text is somewhat simplified. First, the term "leisure" may be
misleading. It includes not only vacation or relaxation time but also time spent with family(which may or may not be relaxing) and other non-judging activities such as teaching at
law schools or writing books. Second, given the backlog of cases many judges face, time-
saving decisions may be reflected not so much in additional leisure time but instead in a
reduced backlog of cases. In turn, backlog may be a factor in the respect judges receive
from the practicing bar or among their judicial colleagues: judges with longer backlogs may
be respected less. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
40. See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional"
about the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 186-87 (1991) [hereinafter
Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior].
[Vol. 51
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ture of judicial compensation. 41 However, judges do have an incentive to
seek promotion within the judiciary-by being appointed to a higher
court.42 Promotion within the judiciary is desirable because of the higher
salary and the greater prestige that comes with sitting on a higher court,43
as well as the expanded ability of higher court judges to promote their
policy preferences. Accordingly, on the margin one would expect judges
to decide cases so as to increase their chances of appointment to a higher
court (such as by making decisions that accord with the policy goals of the
sitting president) and to be more likely to do so when opportunities for
promotion are imminent (e.g., when higher court seats are vacant or va-
cancies are expected).44 To the extent that the desire for promotion al-
ters judicial decision-making, it is a consequence of the existence of an
appeals process. If there were no appeals process, opportunities for ad-
vancement within the judiciary would be extremely limited or non-
existent.
Aversion to Reversal. This element of the judicial utility function also is
a result of the existence of an appeals process. Judges do not like having
their decisions reversed by higher courts.45 Judges who are averse to re-
versal will, on the margin, decide cases so as to reduce the likelihood that
the decision will be reversed on appeal. 46 In addition, even judges who
are not averse to reversal itself will take into account the probability of
reversal to the extent that it has an impact on other elements of their
utility function.47 For example, if a judge's decision is likely to be re-
versed on appeal and remanded for further proceedings, thereby decreas-
ing the judge's leisure time, the judge's incentive to make that decision
may be substantially reduced. This point is developed more in Part III.
41. See supra note 21.
42. Roughly one-half of United States Court of Appeals judges served as district courtjudges before being promoted. See Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 40, at
188. Seven of the nine current United States Supreme Court justices are former court of
appeals judges. See Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 5
n.7.
43. See POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 25-36.
44. See Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust
Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13, 16 (1992) [hereinafter Cohen, The Motives of
Judges]. But see Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 5.
. 45. See, e.g., Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 14;
Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge's Decisionmaking, 39
MERCER L. REv. 937, 949 (1988) (describing "[tihe inevitable narcissistic desire not to be
reversed").
46. See Shavell, supra note 5, at 390-91.
47. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 10, § 19.7, at 535 (explain-
ing judges' "sensitivity to being reversed by a higher court" as derived from the desire of
judges to promote policy preferences: "[t]he reversal wipes out the effect of the judge's
decision both on the parties to the immediate case and on others who are similarly situ-
ated, whose behavior might be influenced by the rule declared by the judge."); TULLOCK,
supra note 36, at 165-66 ("1 suppose an advocate of this argument would say that thejudges are made unhappy and their reputations damaged when their decisions are over-
thrown. To avoid this, they make decisions which they think the higher court will accept.
We cannot prove that this is not true, but I think it would be a fairly weak motive.").
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The available empirical evidence, although mixed, provides some sup-
port for the utility-maximizing model of judicial behavior. Richard Hig-
gins and Paul Rubin hypothesized that frequent reversals hurt a judge's
chance for promotion.48 Because older judges may have less opportunity
for advancement, Higgins and Rubin predicted that reversal rates would
increase with a judge's age. Their empirical work, however, failed to find
any systematic relationship between age and reversal rate in a small sam-
ple of appeals in the Eighth Circuit.49 By comparison, Mark Cohen, in
his study of district court decisions on the constitutionality of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, found that judges with heavy caseloads
were more likely to find the Guidelines unconstitutional.50 According to
Cohen, district court judges believed that the Guidelines would increase
their workload by discouraging plea bargaining. Cohen also theorized
that the Reagan administration might perceive judges holding the Guide-
lines unconstitutional to be unduly activist and thus would be less likely
to appoint them to a higher court. As predicted, Cohen found that judges
with greater promotion potential were more likely to find the Guidelines
constitutional. 51 Similarly, in his study of antitrust sentencing, Cohen
found that increased opportunities for promotion resulted in a statisti-
cally significant increase in the sentences given to antitrust defendants.
5 2
The existing evidence thus provides some support for both leisure and
opportunity for advancement as elements of the judicial utility function.
Indeed, as explained below, the appeals process will tend to mute the
effect of those factors in trial court decisions, making Cohen's findings
even more significant. s3
II. COURT TIERS AND JUDICIAL INCENTIVES
This Part argues that, on the margin, differences in the institutional
characteristics of court tiers will alter the incentives of judges on those
tiers. That is, an identical judge may decide an identical case differently if
that judge is a trial court judge rather than an intermediate appellate
court judge or a Supreme Court Justice-not because of any difference in
the judge's preferences but because of institutional differences that give
rise to different incentives. Indeed, the institutional characteristics of the
appeals process are such that certain elements of the judicial utility func-
tion-particularly leisure and promotion-are likely to play a less signifi-
cant role in judicial decision-making in the appellate courts than in the
trial courts. This Part develops several empirically testable hypotheses
48. See Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129
(1980).
49. See id.
50. See Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 40, at 192-93.
51. See id.
52. See Cohen, The Motives of Judges, supra note 44, at 19-22.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 112-21. This observation applies only to Co-
hen's findings concerning decisions on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines,




that follow from this theoretical point and highlights the implications of
institutional characteristics for research into judicial preferences
generally.
A. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COURT TIERS
The institutional differences between trial courts and appellate courts
are numerous. Some of the most important differences for my analysis
are the following: (1) the nature of the proceeding; (2) the pyramidical
structure of the court system; (3) the court's control over its docket; and
(4) precedential constraints.54 I will use the United States federal court
system as an illustration, although other court systems often share these
same institutional characteristics.
Nature of the Proceeding. Trial courts hear trials; appellate courts hear
appeals. While this is an oversimplification, in essence it is the central
difference between the tiers. Because resolving a dispute often requires
at least some inquiry into the underlying facts, every court system must at
some level decide factual issues. In the United States federal court sys-
tem, the fact finder is the United States district court judge or a jury su-
pervised by the district court judge. Although trial judges decide legal
issues as well as factual issues, appellate review of legal issues is de
novo.55 By comparison, judges on the United States courts of appeals
and (even more so) Justices on the United States Supreme Court largely
defer to the fact findings of the trial court. Moreover, an appeals court
that determines further proceedings are necessary remands the case to
the trial court to conduct the further proceedings; the appeals court does
not conduct those proceedings itself.56
The primary responsibility of trial courts for fact finding has a signifi-
cant effect upon the nature of cases in trial and appeals courts.57 First,
the possible variation in the time required for any particular case is
greater at the trial level than at the appellate level. Cases in both courts
vary in time demands. Some trials are short; some are long. Some ap-
peals are resolved with a short opinion without oral argument; others re-
54. Another institutional difference that deserves brief comment is public scrutiny.
Appellate courts (particularly the United States Supreme Court) receive the greatest pub-
lic scrutiny of their decisions. They issue written opinions seeking to justify most of their
decisions. Trial courts, by comparison, issue far fewer written opinions. But, so far as day-
to-day activities go, trial judges are under much greater scrutiny than appellate court
judges. Trial judges appear in court more frequently, often before the same lawyers, and
very quickly develop a reputation in the local legal community. Appeals judges appear in
court only to hear oral argument and are less likely to be seen repeatedly by the same
lawyers. See Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 7.
55. See generally Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1, 4-10 (1991) (discussing appellate standards of review).
56. By comparison, civil law court systems often have a greater degree of fact review
at the first tier of appellate review; however, even those court systems limit the highest
levels of appellate review to legal issues. See Herzog & Karlen, supra note 2, §§ 8-53, 8-92.
57. If the parties agree on the facts in the trial court but disagree as to the law or the
application of the law to the facts, a district court case will look much more like an appeals
court case. However, such a situation is the exception rather than the rule.
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quire oral argument and an extensive opinion. Indeed, the average time
a judge spends on a single case may be no greater at the trial level than at
the appellate level.58 But the variance in time per case is greater in trial
court cases. The time a trial judge spends on longer cases can be greater
than the time an appeals judge spends on longer appeals-much greater
in some instances. 59
Second, trial courts have less ability to delegate time-consuming work
than appellate judges. Appellate judges delegate substantial parts of case
preparation and opinion-writing-the two most time-consuming tasks of
an appeals judge-to law clerks.60 Trial court judges, by comparison, can-
not delegate time spent presiding over trials to a law clerk; indeed, even
magistrate judges are statutorily precluded from sitting in the district
judge's place in a jury trial without the consent of both parties.61
Third, trial judges have greater abilities to cut cases short (by decision
or by encouraging settlement) than do appellate judges. Appellate judges
can (and do) avoid complicated issues by deciding on simpler grounds.
They can decide cases without oral argument, which saves argument and
preparation time. Seldom do appellate judges dispense with an opinion
altogether (by reliance on the trial court's opinion, for example), which
would save even more time.62 By comparison, a district court judge who
grants a motion to dismiss can avoid years of pretrial haggling between
the parties, a potentially lengthy trial, pre- and post-trial motions, accom-
panying opinions, and the like. Indeed, the more active role of trial court
judges in encouraging settlement is strong evidence that the benefits to
the judge of settlement (and, by extension, to making dispositive legal
rulings) are greater at the trial level than at the appeals level. While ap-
peals courts have begun taking steps to encourage parties to settle,63
58. Compare Appellate Court Caseweights Project, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS 309, 317-18 (1988) (estimated average hours
spent by courts of appeals judges per type of case ranged from 4.0 to 34.1) with FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, 1979 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIME STUDY 36-37 (1980) [hereinafter
1979 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIME STUDY] (average time spent by district court judges
in several categories of cases ranged from 56.07 minutes to 2516.45 minutes during record-
ing period); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 169 app. C tbl. 19 (1996) (average time spent by district court
judges on certified class action was 34.5 hours and on uncertified class action was 6.1
hours).
59. See 1979 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIME STUDY, supra note 58, at 35-37 (the
longest antitrust case in survey required 21,680 minutes of district judge time; the longest
diversity case required 5650 minutes; and the longest criminal case required 5500 minutes;
indeed, the antitrust case "alone accounted for 1.18 percent of all time recorded in the
entire survey"); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS 12 (1988) (median length of trials ranged from 9 hours, 48
minutes to 30 hours, 48 minutes; 75th percentile ranged from 13 hours, 56 minutes to 47
hours, four minutes; 95th percentile ranged from 22 hours, 14 minutes to 160 hours, 35
minutes).
60. See Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 19 (noting
that judges often decide a case and then delegate the opinion-writing task to law clerks).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1994).
62. See BAKER, supra note 31, at 121-25.




those efforts lag far behind the well-documented efforts of trial court
judges to promote settlement. 64
Control over Docket. United States district court judges have virtually
no control over what cases will come before them. Lawsuits are initiated
by plaintiffs, who choose the forum in which to file suit. Cases are then
assigned to judges essentially on a random basis.65 A judge has a handful
of devices to use to shift a case to a different court, but those devices are
available only in very limited circumstances.66
Similarly, United States court of appeals judges have little control over
their docket. Appeals are available as a matter of right,67 and the deci-
sion to appeal is in the control of the parties. The timing of the appeal is
governed by the doctrine of finality, which generally limits appeals to "fi-
nal" decisions of the trial court.68 But in virtually every case a final deci-
sion of the trial court can be appealed. After a decision is appealed, the
case is assigned to a panel of judges by the court administrator; the judges
have little or no control over the selection of cases they hear.69
By comparison, the United States Supreme Court has virtually com-
plete control over its docket. Parties file petitions for certiorari asking
the Court to review their case; thus, the Supreme Court also is limited to
those issues the parties bring before it. But unlike the lower federal
courts, the Supreme Court ordinarily is not required to review the cases
brought to it.70 If the Supreme Court does not want to review a case or
64. See, e.g., D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT
JUDGES 23 (1986) ("most [trial court] judges encourage lawyers to settle civil cases" and
"use a variety of techniques to do so"); Robel, supra note 36, at 16-17, 37-57 (discussing
settlement as a means of coping with caseload pressures in federal district courts while not
even mentioning settlement in discussing court of appeals caseloads).
65. See Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 266-70 (1995).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) (transfer); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981) (forum non conveniens).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 278 (1964)
("[w]e deal with the federal system where the appeal is a matter of right.").
68. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981) (describ-
ing benefits of rule of finality); see also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note
10, § 21.14.
69. The clerk's office assigns cases to panels of judges, either randomly or in a manner
that balances their respective calendars by case type. Separately, judges are assigned to
oral argument panels with no consideration of the specific cases to be heard. See, e.g., 3D
CIR. IOP 1.1 ("fully briefed cases are randomly assigned by the Clerk to a three-judge
panel"); 4TH CIR. IOP 34.1 (clerk maintains a list of cases "and on a monthly basis merges
those cases with a list of three judge panels provided by a computer program designed to
achieve total random selection"); Sm CIR. lOP and 5TH CIR. R. 34 (functions of assigning
judges and calendaring cases are "carefully separated... [t]o insure complete objectivity");
11TH CIR. IOP 2, 3 (functions of judge assignment and case assignment are separated; the
clerk attempts to balance caseload of panels by case type).
70. See 28 U.S.C. 88 1254(1), 1257 (1994). In 1988, Congress passed legislation signifi-
cantly reducing the mandatory appeals jurisdiction of the court and giving the court essen-
tially total control over its docket. See Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988); ROBERT
L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE §§ 2.1, 3.1-3.2 (7th ed. 1993). For a discus-
sion of the limited exceptions to this rule, see id. §§ 2.5-2.9. Even before the passage of
that legislation, however, the Court exercised significant discretion in deciding cases within
its appellate jurisdiction. Id.
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cases, it simply denies the petition for certiorari. 7 ' Indeed, during the
October 1996 term, the Court granted review in only 1.3 percent of all
cases filed with it.72
Pyramidical Structure. Court systems typically are structured like a
pyramid: a large number of trial courts make up the lowest tier of the
pyramid, several intermediate appellate courts occupy the middle tier,
and the pyramid is topped by one supreme court.73 The federal court
system in the United States reflects such a pyramidical structure-there
are 632 United States district court judgeships, 179 United States court of
appeals judgeships, and nine Supreme Court justices. 74 It is a matter of
simple mathematics that the opportunities for promotion within such a
pyramidical structure are greatest for district court judges and signifi-
cantly less for court of appeals judges.75
Conversely, as Lewis Kornhauser has pointed out, "the composition of
the courts at each level, by contrast, form an inverted pyramid:" United
States district court judges ordinarily decide cases alone, United States
courts of appeals judges usually sit in panels of three when hearing cases,
and the nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court hear all cases
brought before the court. 76 The collegial decision-making of appeals
courts is seen as aiding the accuracy of appellate decision-making. 77 It
also means that the time savings from any particular decision must be
shared among multiple judges.
Stare Decisis. An important distinction between judicial tiers lies in the
degree to which judges are bound by or adhere to the principle of stare
decisis-that is, the degree to which judges follow precedent. 78 The con-
71. If Supreme Court Justices do not, for legal or practical reasons, deny a petition,
they may fall back on "decision-avoidance doctrines, such as mootness, ripeness, political
question, and the absence of a real case or controversy.., in order to reduce the element
of hassle in their work." Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at
39.
72. See 66 U.S.L.W. 3136 (Aug. 12, 1997) (2055 paid cases and 4578 in forma pauperis
cases docketed during term; 87 cases made available for argument).
73. See Herzog & Karlen, supra note 2, § 8-9; POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra
note 7, at 3-5; MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 24 ("the Canadian system is a single pyramid
(possibly best conceptualized with a large lump on one smooth side representing the fed-
eral courts)").
74. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 44(a), 133(a) (1994).
75. There are 6.5 district court judgeships for every court of appeals judgeship, and
19.9 court of appeals judgeships for every Supreme Court justiceship. The potential for
promotion for district judges may vary depending on the number of vacancies in the circuit
in which the district court is located (and, indeed, whether the vacancy is one that previ-
ously was filled by a court of appeals judge from the state in which the district court sits).
Nevertheless, the potential for promotion for a district judge is still likely to be greater
than for a court of appeals judge.
76. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierar-
chy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1607-08 (1995).
77. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Prece-
dents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 846-47 (1994).
78. For economic analyses of stare decisis, see, McNollgast, supra note 25; Miceli &
Cosgel, supra note 27; Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10;
Rasmusen, supra note 33; Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Prece-
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straining effect of precedent differs depending upon whether the judge is
a trial judge, an intermediate appellate judge, or a Supreme Court Justice.
Supreme Court Justices are least constrained by precedent. Court of ap-
peals judges are bound by prior Supreme Court decisions and by prior
circuit precedent unless the court of appeals sits en banc and overrules
the prior case. Federal district court judges likewise are bound by
Supreme Court precedent and precedent of the circuit in which the dis-
trict court is located. The degree to which courts make decisions with
precedential effect is inversely related to the precedential constraint.
Supreme Court decisions are binding on all lower federal courts. Court
of appeals decisions are binding on other panels in the same circuit and
on all federal district courts in the circuit. Decisions by district court
judges do not bind even other district courts in the same district.79
B. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND JUDICIAL INCENTIVES
Because of the institutional differences among court tiers, the incen-
tives facing judges at each of those tiers differ as well. Take a simple
judicial utility function with three elements: deciding (including both rea-
soning utility and ideological utility), leisure, and promotion. The judicial
preference for respect reinforces the utility a judge receives from decid-
ing, and so I will not treat respect as a separate element. The judicial
preference for discretion may be important in certain cases, such as Co-
hen's study of decisions on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, which I discuss further below,80 but otherwise I put it aside. For the
time being I also will put aside the extent to which the appeals process
constrains decision-making by lower courts in the judicial hierarchy (in-
cluding a judge's aversion to being reversed). That is the subject of Part
III. What I develop in this Part is how the institutional characteristics of
the court tiers, as described above, affect the decision-making of a utility-
maximizing judge or justice.
Trial judges will decide cases so as to maximize their utility, which con-
sists of the elements of deciding, leisure, and promotion. The prominence
of each of these elements will vary depending on the judge and the case,
but on the margin, all may affect how a judge decides a case. This model
includes leisure and the desire for promotion, both of which are sup-
ported by Cohen's findings. 81 The trial judge likely will face tradeoffs (as
will appellate judges) among the various elements of the judicial utility
function. For example, more carefully reasoned opinions (or opinions
that further ideological goals in the face of potentially contrary prece-
dent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976); Jonathan R. Ma-
cey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KErT L. REV. 93
(1989); Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic
Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736 (1993).
79. See Caminker, supra note 77, at 824-25.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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dent) require more time to prepare, and thus reduce a trial judge's utility
derived from leisure.
At the intermediate appellate court level, both leisure and promotion
play a relatively less important role in judicial decision-making than they
play at the trial court level, all else equal, although both may still be sig-
nificant on the margin. Because of the nature of trials versus appeals, the
decision of an appellate court judge in a particular case will less likely be
affected by his or her preference for leisure than that of a trial court
judge. A trial court judge who grants a summary judgment motion may
avoid presiding over a long trial. An appellate court judge who reverses
the grant of a summary judgment motion does not have to conduct the
trial on remand; the trial court judge who originally granted the motion
does. In addition, a decision that enhances leisure time in a particular
case at the trial court level principally benefits the judge making the deci-
sion. At the appellate level, a majority of the panel must agree to the
time-saving decision. Yet the benefit of time saved will go largely to the
judge writing the opinion, and thus the other judges have less incentive to
decide cases so as to reduce workload. 82 The opportunities for advance-
ment also are far fewer at the court of appeals level than at the district
court level (although the difference is counteracted to some degree by the
greater reward of being appointed to the Supreme Court). As a result,
the utility an appellate judge derives from deciding-including both rea-
soning utility and ideological utility-will be relatively more important
than at the trial court level. While appellate judges can overturn prior
circuit precedent, they generally must sit en banc to do so, such that the
constraining effect of precedent is similar at the two tiers. But, unlike
trial court judges, appeals court judges make decisions with precedential
effect-they bind district courts and other panels in the same circuit. Ap-
pellate judges also are constrained in promoting their preferences by the
fact that at least one other judge on the panel must agree with the deci-
sion. Overall, however, appeals court judges likely have greater ability
and incentive to make decisions that promote their own policy prefer-
ences than do trial court judges.
Finally, at the level of the highest appellate court, leisure and promo-
tion are even less important than at the intermediate appellate court
level. The United States Supreme Court has virtually total control over
its docket, meaning that it can control its workload by denying certiorari
in more cases rather than by adopting substantive legal rules that enhance
its leisure. And there are no higher courts to which a Supreme Court
Justice can be promoted. Thus, the utility derived from deciding will be
the central element in judicial decision-making at the highest court. In
addition, the Supreme Court is far less constrained by precedent than
82. The fact that appellate panels hear multiple cases at one sitting may provide judges
some ability to overcome this difficulty by sharing the time savings from several appeals.
The ability to cooperate on future appeals is limited, however, because the judges making
up the panels change at every argument session.
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lower courts are, and can make precedential decisions with far greater
reach than courts of appeals, with the result being that Justices will be
relatively more likely than lower court judges to decide cases to further
their ideological preferences.83
The fundamental points are twofold. First, on the margin, the differing
institutional characteristics change the relative importance of judicial
preferences. Second, as a case moves up the judicial hierarchy, a judge's
preferences for leisure and promotion become relatively less important,
and a judge's preferences for deciding-and particularly a judge's ideo-
logical preferences-become relatively more important in judicial deci-
sion-making.
Both of these points can be illustrated by Cohen's study of district
court rulings on the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.8 4 The Guidelines replaced what was largely unguided trial
court discretion in imposing criminal sentences with calibrated guidelines
that significantly restricted trial court discretion. For this reason alone,
one might expect utility-maximizing trial judges to find the guidelines un-
constitutional.8 5 In addition, trial courts feared that the Guidelines would
increase their workload by discouraging plea bargains. This, too, gave
trial judges an incentive to rule against the Guidelines, one that Cohen
verified empirically. Conversely, Cohen predicted that trial judges who
hoped to be promoted to the court of appeals would likely uphold the
Guidelines to avoid being perceived as too "activist" by Republicans. His
findings supported this prediction. Finally, there was little relevant prece-
dent, leaving trial judges largely unconstrained by stare decisis in making
their decisions.
But the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on a judge's utility differs
dramatically if the judge is on the highest appellate court rather than a
trial court. A United States Supreme Court Justice would be largely un-
affected by workload concerns or the reduction in discretion resulting
from the Guidelines, given its virtually absolute discretion in deciding
what cases to hear. Promotion also would be of little concern. One would
expect ideological grounds to drive the Supreme Court's decision. Thus,
it should not be surprising that a majority of the almost 200 district judges
who ruled on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines found
them unconstitutional, 86 while the United States Supreme Court, by an 8-
to-1 vote, found the Guidelines constitutional.8 7
83. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATITUDINAL MODEL 69-72 (1993).
84. See Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 40, at 183.
85. See id. at 186-87; Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at
21.
86. See Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 40, at 191 (116 of 196-
59%-of district court judges held the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional).
87. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362 (1989); see also Cohen, Explaining
Judicial Behavior, supra note 40, at 187. Because the Supreme Court granted certiorari
before judgment in a case from the Eighth Circuit, no United States court of appeals ever




The theory that differing institutional characteristics affect judicial de-
cision-making gives rise to several hypotheses that may be empirically
tested. First, all else being equal, a judge's preference for leisure will
have the greatest relative influence on decisions at the trial court level,
where the judge's decision on one aspect of a case can result in a far
greater time savings than at the appeals court level. Similarly, because
trial court judges have more opportunities for promotion than appellate
court judges, that element of the judicial utility function likewise should
be most important at the trial court level. Conversely, a judge's prefer-
ence for particular outcomes (i.e., ideology) will have the greatest relative
influence on decisions at the highest appellate court level, where other
elements such as leisure and promotion potential are much less impor-
tant, where precedent is least constraining, and where decisions affect the
greatest number of future cases.88
Thus, one would expect to find stronger relationships between judicial
decisions and factors such as caseload and opportunity for promotion in
trial courts than in appeals courts. That, indeed, is where the relationship
has been found in existing research. 89 Conversely, one would expect to
find stronger relationships between judicial decisions and ideology-mea-
sured by variables such as the appointing president and personal charac-
teristics of the judges or justices-in cases at the appellate level than at
the trial court level. This prediction seems to find support in empirical
studies of judicial decision-making, which more consistently find variables
reflecting ideology important in the United States Supreme Court90 and
88. For a different view, see Ashenfelter et al., supra note 65, at 264 ("[i]n their isola-
tion, district judges may feel less constrained by legal doctrine and thus be more likely to
follow political inclinations, precisely because district judges decide alone and often with-
out publishing an opinion."). Note that the concentration of cases presenting ideological
issues likely will be greater at appellate levels as well, complicating any empirical analysis.
See id. at 281. In addition, appointments to higher appellate courts may be based more on
ideological grounds, given the greater precedential reach of decisions by those courts.
89. See Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 40, at 193; Cohen, The Mo-
tives of Judges, supra note 44, at 22.
90. See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges' Attributes and Case Characteristics:
An Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE
277, 280 (1.988) ("political party identification and judicial experience" are "predictors of
justices' votes in equal protection cases"); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological
Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557, 561-62
(1989) ("results provide exceptional support for the attitudinal model as applied to civil
liberties cases"); C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978,
75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 355, 362-66 (1981) (developing "satisfactory 'attribute' models of
judges' decision-making behavior"); S. Sidney Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator to
the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. J. POL. Sci. 622, 625 (1973)
(finding that age at appointment, federal administrative experience, and religious affilia-
tion explained "70 percent of the variance in the rate at which ... 14 justices supported
state or federal governments in criminal cases"). See also John R. Schmidhauser, Stare
Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 14 U. TORONTo L.J. 194, 209-12 (1962) (relating backgrounds of justices to propen-
sity to dissent and adherence to precedent).
[Vol. 51
APPEALS PROCESS
the United States courts of appeals 9' than in the United States district
courts.
9 2
Second, the theory predicts that individual judges or Justices will de-
cide cases differently, all else being equal, when sitting as trial court
judges than when sitting as appeals court judges. It might be possible, for
91. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the
1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 120-21 (1991) ("conservatism of a substantial number of
Carter appointees has yielded a greater convergence of Carter and Reagan voting conduct
than the conservative court-packing hypothesis would predict"); Jon Gottschall, Reagan's
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70
JUDICATURE 48, 54 (1986) ("When voting on four civil rights and three economic issues
which were thought likely to divide judges of different ideological predispositions, Rea-
gan's appointees are not clearly or dramatically more conservative than Nixon's or Ford's
appointees, although they are clearly more conservative than appointees of the Carter,
Kennedy and Johnson administrations"); Donald R. Songer, The Policy Consequences of
Senate Involvement in the Selection of Judges in the United States Courts of Appeals, 35 W.
POL. Q. 107, 113 (1982) (data "reinforce the suspicion that the policy positions of presi-
dents influence the selection of appeals court judges"); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior
on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 491, 504 (1975)
(concluding that it "appears reasonable that the judicial behavior of appeals court judges
be interpreted as representing gradations of broadly defined political and economic liberal-
conservative attitudes"); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 374, 382 (1966) ("there appears to be some
evidence of . . . 'liberal' and 'conservative' voting on issues involving political liberalism
and economic liberalism").
92. See ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 7 (1983) ("the evidence for a relationship between judicial
background variables and subsequent policy decisions is somewhat inconclusive. Although
it is fairly strong for appellate court judges, it is weak and inconsistent for trial jurists").
Compare, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 65, at 281 ("we cannot find that Republican
judges differ from Democratic judges in their treatment of civil rights cases"); Cohen, The
Motives of Judges, supra note 44, at 24 ("[o]ne somewhat surprising result is the apparent
lack of systematic difference in sentencing patterns between Democratic and Republican
judges."); Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 40, at 196 ("Few of the ideology
or demographic variables were significant in either equation."); Thomas G. Walker &
Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifica-
tions, 47 J. POL. 596, 614-15 (1985) (finding no areas of significant difference between
judges of different race and few between judges of different sex); and Thomas G. Walker,
A Note Concerning Partisan Influences on Trial-Judge Decision Making, 6 L. & Soc'Y REV.
645, 647 (1972) ("[t]he notion that the political party of district judges and decisional out-
comes on civil liberties litigation are related does not receive support in this analysis");
with Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76
JUDICATURE 298, 300 (1993) (district court "appointees of Democratic presidents clearly
have been more liberal in their decisions than those of Republicans"); Vicki Schultz &
Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of
Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073,
1170-80 (1992) (finding a relationship between political party and appointing president and
the outcomes of sex discrimination cases, but no relationship between these attributes and
the outcomes of race discrimination cases); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson,
The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1151, 1190-91 (1991) (finding some judicial background variables statistically significant,
but also finding that political party and appointing president were not statistically signifi-
cant in explaining outcomes in race discrimination cases); C.K. Rowland et al., Presidential
Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22 L. &
Soc'v REV. 191, 195-96 (1988) ("In the aggregate Carter appointees are almost twice as
supportive of criminal defendants as are Reagan appointees"); and Kenneth N. Vines, Fed-
eral District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South, 26 J. POL. 337, 356-57 (1964)




example, to examine a sample of similar cases decided by judges who
were promoted from a United States district court to a United States
court of appeals. This theory would predict that, all else being equal,
leisure and promotion would be relatively less important after promotion
than before. Alternatively, a sample of trial court judges sitting by
designation on appellate courts (or vice-versa) might be used, 93 although
the temporary nature of the designations might make the results less
clear.94
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL PREFERENCES
The theory described above also has implications for research on judi-
cial preferences generally. Because the incentives of judges at each tier
of the court system differ, on the margin one would expect utility-maxi-
mizing judges to behave differently depending on whether they sit on a
trial court, an intermediate appellate court, or the Supreme Court. Ac-
cordingly, in seeking to understand a particular decision or rule as a prod-
uct of judicial preferences it is important to focus upon the incentives of
the judges or Justices on the particular court making the decision or
promulgating the rule rather than upon the supposed preferences of the
judiciary generally. Consistent with this caution, Cohen,95 as well as Hig-
gins and Rubin,96 developed models of the preferences of United States
district court judges and used those models to predict the behavior of
those judges. Judge Posner distinguished between the incentives of trial
court judges and those of appeals court judges, and directed his attention
to the latter.97
Other analyses of judicial preferences do not draw this distinction. For
example, several commentators have linked pro-arbitration decisions by
the United States Supreme Court to the judicial preference for leisure,
suggesting that courts that favor arbitration do so to reduce their own
caseload.98 That suggestion makes little sense as applied to the Supreme
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1994).
94. Although the sample size would be small, one could also compare the decision-
making of the United States Supreme Court in its certiorari docket with the Court's deci-
sion-making in its original jurisdiction docket-cases, such as those between states, in
which the Court acts as a trial court with no right to appeal. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2;
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994). This theory would predict that Justices would exhibit a far greater
preference for leisure in original cases because of the differing nature of the proceeding.
And in fact they do-the Justices do not conduct trials themselves but appoint a special
master to conduct the proceedings and review the report of the special master based on
objections by the parties. See STERN ET AL., supra note 70, § 10.12.
95. See Cohen, The Motives of Judges, supra note 44, at 15-17; Cohen, Explaining Judi-
cial Behavior, supra note 40, at 186-90.
96. See Higgins & Rubin, supra note 48, at 130-33.
97. See Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 10, at 6-7, 13-30.
98. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforce-
ment of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
U.M.K.C. L. REv. 449, 449 (1996) ("[t]aking the task into their own hands, judges, in an
attempt to reduce their workload without increasing costs or delays, have embraced arbi-
tration as an alternate means for resolving disputes"); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Cor-
porate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
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Court. The Court, which has significantly extended the enforceability of
arbitration agreements in recent years,99 already has almost total control
over its docket and would not significantly (if at all) reduce its caseload
by encouraging arbitration. 1°° By comparison, the enhanced enforceabil-
ity of arbitration agreements presumably would benefit trial courts by re-
ducing their caseload. But trial court judges who enforce arbitration
agreements today are not necessarily doing so for their own benefit-
they are constrained by the Supreme Court decisions in favor of enforce-
ability. There is no way to know for certain whether those courts would
have decided the same way without that constraint, although the theory
of judicial preferences predicts that, all else being equal, they would.
Jonathan Macey's analysis of Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.'0 1 is subject to a similar criticism.' 0 2 In Chevron,
the United States Supreme Court adopted a two-tiered approach to judi-
cial review of statutory interpretations by administrative agencies, provid-
ing for active judicial scrutiny if a statute is clear and deference to the
agency if the statute is ambiguous. 03 Macey contends that from the per-
spective of judicial self-interest, "Chevron must be viewed as an act of
genius" because it permits judges to use their generic legal skills (which
Macey suggests judges prefer to do) and "to minimize the time and effort
involved in judging."'01 4 While Supreme Court Justices may in fact prefer
to use generic legal skills, I am skeptical of Macey's reliance on the judi-
WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 643 (1996) ("[wlhile binding arbitration may well be preferable from
the standpoint of certain segments of society-particularly.., judges who can reduce their
own workload-there is no reason to believe that society as a whole is better off with
binding arbitration"); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REv. 83, 137-38 (1996) ("the Court's strongly pro-arbitration decisions of the
last twenty years are ... largely consistent with a 'docket-clearing' theory of arbitration.
That is, they are largely consistent with the view that courts favor arbitration as a way to
reduce their caseloads whether or not parties have contracted for it"). See also Casarotto
v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (writing
to "those federal judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for their 'heavy
case loads' "-addressing court of appeals judge by name but apparently including United
States Supreme Court Justices), vacated sub nom., Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515
U.S. 1129 (1995).
99. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
100. See supra note 70. One or more of the justices may well believe-as a matter of
their own ideologies-that the judiciary as a whole would be more effective if it had a
reduced workload and uphold the enforceability of arbitration agreements to further this
preference. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec.
1985, at 4. This is what Ian Macneil seems to be saying when he identifies a Supreme Court
"policy" of "docket-clearing:" i.e., that "the Court is motivated to reduce the cases having
to be tried by the judicial system, particularly the federal judicial system." IAN R. MAC-
NEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATION-
ALIZATION 172 (1992).
101. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
102. See Macey, supra note 34, at 639-41.
103. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
104. Macey, supra note 34, at 640-41.
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cial "taste[ ] for leisure"' 05-again, the Supreme Court has little need to
use Chevron to protect its leisure time. Instead, Macey's argument seems
to be that the Supreme Court was acting in the self-interest of others-
the rest of the federal judiciary-in deciding Chevron.106
Macey's companion argument-that significant features of the rules of
procedure governing practice in the United States district courts can be
explained by the self-interest of district court judgesl 07-also is subject to
question on similar grounds. Macey's focus on judicial preferences is
broadly consistent with my approach here, and his argument may be per-
suasive as applied to recent amendments to the Federal Rules. 10 8 How-
ever, his claims are too broad. A number of the rules Macey examines,
particularly those concerning liberal discovery practices (Rules 26-37)
and offers of judgment (Rule 68), have been in existence since 1938 when
the Federal Rules were originally promulgated.' 0 9 Although federal trial
judges today have a significant representation on the committee that
drafts amendments to the Federal Rules, that was not the case in 1938.
No sitting judges were on the Advisory Committee that drafted the origi-
nal Federal Rules. 110 Although the Committee consulted with federal
105. Id. at 641.
106. For different analyses of Chevron based on economic models of judicial behavior,
see Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, L. & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 25, at 1051. See also Peter L.
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121
(1987) (Chevron "can be seen as a device for managing the courts of appeals that can
reduce (although not eliminate) the Supreme Court's need to police their decisions for
accuracy.").
107. See Macey, supra note 34, at 635-39.
108. Even today there is significant involvement of parties other than district court
judges in drafting amendments to the Federal Rules-including a United States court of
appeals judge (who would likely have different incentives than a trial judge), a state court
judge (who competes with federal judges as to cases in which parties can choose among
fora), and private attorneys (who, as Macey acknowledges, may have very different prefer-
ences for procedural rules than trial court judges). See id. at 628. In addition, changes in
the rulemaking process have led some to fear a growing importance of organized private
interests, although how such interest groups would influence independent federal judges
has not yet fully been explained. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory
Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 843-55 (1991); see
also Macey, supra note 34, at 646.
109. The Federal Rules have been amended since 1938 on a number of occasions, but
the key features of the discovery rules and Rule 68 were in place in 1938. See 2 JAMES WM.
MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL
RULES § 26.01, at 2443 (1938) (describing Federal Rules as providing "full and equal mu-
tual discovery"); id. at 3363 (quoting original Rule 68).
110. The original members of the Advisory Committee were William D. Mitchell, Scott
M. Loftin, George W. Wickersham, Wilbur Cherry, Charles E. Clark, Armistead M. Dobie,
Robert G. Dodge, George Donworth, Joseph G. Gamble, Monte M. Lemann, Edmund M.
Morgan, Warren Olney, Jr., Edson R. Sunderland, and Edgar B. Tolman. See Order of
June 3, 1935, Appointing Advisory Committee, 295 U.S. 774 (1935). George Wharton Pep-
per replaced Wickersham after Wickersham's death. See Order of February 17, 1936, Ap-
pointing a Member of the Advisory Committee, 297 U.S. 731 (1936). The members of the
Advisory Committee were practicing lawyers and legal academics, although several had
judicial experience. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1004, at 22 (1987). Cf POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,
supra note 10, § 19.7, at 534 ("where a particular outcome would promote the interest of a
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trial judges and shared drafts of the proposed rules (as it did with the
practicing bar as well), the drafters themselves were not judges.11' A the-
ory that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as originally drafted reflect
the self-interest of the judiciary thus needs a better explanation for pre-
cisely how that happened.
III. THE APPEALS PROCESS AS A CONSTRAINT ON
JUDICIAL PREFERENCES
Thus far this Article has examined how judicial incentives differ across
the tiers of the court system and why elements of the judicial utility func-
tion such as leisure and promotion are relatively less important (and the
judge's utility from deciding relatively more important) in judicial deci-
sion-making at the appellate level than at the trial level. This Part devel-
ops the implications of these points for an understanding of the appeals
process. Importantly, this Part holds the preferences of judges constant
in examining how the appeals process constrains the preferences of lower
court judges. Certainly, if judges have different preferences, they may
decide cases differently; appeals courts may reverse decisions of trial
court judges on the basis of their differing preferences. 112 This Part con-
siders the constraining function of the appeals process in holding judicial
preferences constant, and describes how the appeals process nonetheless
serves as an important constraint on lower court decision-making.
A. THE APPEALS PROCESS AND JUDICIAL INCENTIVES:
A SIMPLE ILLUSTRATION
The proposition that an appeals process constrains lower courts, to va-
rying degrees at least, is commonplace. At a minimum, the appeals pro-
cess provides such a constraint in cases in which the appellate court
reverses the lower court. The appeals process affords an adversely af-
fected party the opportunity to have a case reviewed by judges whose
group to which the judge no longer belongs,. . . the judge's self-interest is not advanced by
selecting that outcome, although his previous experience may lead him to evaluate the
merits of the case differently from judges of different backgrounds."). Donworth was a
United States district judge from 1909-1912 who then returned to private practice. Olney
was an associate justice on the California Supreme Court from 1919-1921, after which he
also returned to private practice. Clark and Dobie were appointed to the federal bench
(court of appeals and district court, respectively) in 1939-after the effective date of the
Federal Rules. See WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA vols. I-IV, VII, X (1950-1993).
111. See Order of January 17, 1938, Expressing Appreciation, 302 U.S. 783 (1938); see
also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 110, § 1004, at 24-25 & nn.12, 15, & 17. It could be
that some of the drafters anticipated being appointed to the bench, but in fact nowhere
near a majority were ever appointed. See supra note 110.
112. McNollgast, supra note 25, at 1646 (describing a model in which legal "[d]octrine
emerges as part of the equilibrium interaction among the Supreme Court and the lower
courts, each acting to maximize its own preferences or ideology. The Supreme Court sets a
narrow or wide range of acceptable decisions to induce the optimal pattern of compliance
among the lower courts. Judges in the lower courts are modeled as strategic actors facing a
trade-off between pursuing a personal policy agenda and seeing some of their decisions
reversed by a higher court, and adopting the best available complying doctrine, without
fear of successful appeal.").
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decision is less likely, all else being equal, to be affected by judicial pref-
erences for leisure and promotion. In addition, appellate court decisions
serve as a constraint to the extent that lower courts follow appellate pre-
cedent in deciding a case. 113 That precedent, again, will be established by
judges whose decisions are relatively less influenced by leisure and pro-
motion than, on the margin, the trial court judge would be. Beyond that,
commentators have grounded the constraining effect of appeals in judges'
aversion to reversal of their decisions. The assumption is that judges do
not like being reversed by appellate courts, so they decide cases to reduce
the possibility of reversal. 114
The focus here on judicial incentives suggests another way in which the
appeals process constrains lower court decision-making-by requiring a
lower court judge, when making a decision, to take into account the pos-
sibility of review by a decision-maker with different incentives. A trial
judge ruling on a summary judgment motion, which, if granted, would
avoid a six-month trial, will consider the likelihood that a decision grant-
ing the motion will be reversed and the case will then proceed to trial. 15
All else being equal, the more important judicial preferences other than
deciding are in the trial court's decision, the greater the likelihood of re-
versal because those preferences will be less important in the appeals
court's decision on the same case. Thus, an appeals process will alter the
trial judge's incentives-and perhaps the judge's decision-without re-
gard to whether the judge has some particular aversion to being reversed
by the appellate court. Instead, the trial judge must merely consider the
possibility of further proceedings following remand in his or her decision-
making calculus, as a rational decision-maker would do. This constraint
does not eliminate all errors. The probability of appeal and reversal will
be uncertain, and judges will discount the costs of future proceedings fol-
lowing any remand. Thus, trial judge "errors" will still occur. Nonethe-
less, by changing the trial court's incentives, the appeals process reduces
the likelihood of such errors.
What follows is a simple and hypothetical example that illustrates this
incentives-altering aspect of the appeals process. In this illustration, the
appeals court not only would correct an error by the trial court, but, in
fact, the mere existence of the appeals process will prevent that error
from happening. The "error" is not a simple mistake, but is a result of the
incentives facing the trial court. Preventing that error results from chang-
ing those incentives by establishing an appeals process. This illustration
does not show that in every case the appeals process serves this function,
113. See, e.g., Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seri-
ously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 89 (1985).
114. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 5, at 390-91; see supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
Indeed, their aversion to being reversed might induce some judges to take excessive pre-
cautions against reversal. Id. at 391 n.21; Dalton, supra note 113, at 86-93.
115. See Macey, supra note 34, at 633 ("when a case is reversed on appeal it generally is
returned to the trial judge who originally ordered the dismissal. Consequently, dismissal
on the law, if reversed, will not permit the trial judge to avoid hearing the case").
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but it does demonstrate that it can, in fact, do so. The illustration admit-
tedly is a highly simplified one and one with values carefully chosen
(although not necessarily unrealistically) to make it work. Nonetheless, it
illustrates the key point of the analysis-that the appeals process con-
strains lower courts by changing their incentives.
1. Trial Judge as Sole Decision-Maker
I begin with a highly simplified model of the litigation process. The
first step in this model is the filing of a complaint by the plaintiff. The
defendant responds by filing a dispositive motion challenging the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. If the trial court grants this motion, the de-
fendant wins. If the motion is denied, the case proceeds to discovery and
trial. At the conclusion of the trial, one or the other party wins. Initially,
I assume that no appeal is available to the losing party-the trial judge is
the sole decision-maker. Eventually I will add an appeals process. For
now, I focus on the incentives facing the trial judge as the sole decision-
maker.
I assume that the trial judge will decide the case to maximize the
judge's utility. For simplicity, I assume that the judge derives utility from
only two elements-deciding and leisure-and that the case is not one
from which the judge will receive any ideological utility from the out-
come. There is a tradeoff between these two elements of the judge's util-
ity function. To make a better decision (i.e., one that is more correct
given the facts of the case and existing law), the judge must spend more
time working on the case and less time engaged in the leisure activities
the judge enjoys. Conversely, spending more time at leisure makes it less
likely that the judge will decide the case correctly. At a minimum, the
judge could spend no time at all on the case-simply guessing at the out-
come-and still have some probability of getting it right. In addition,
assume that from a societal viewpoint, the "correct" decision is for the
plaintiff to prevail.
For purposes of this illustration, I will assign the following values to the
various outcomes that might result from the case. If the judge decides the
case correctly, assume that the judge's benefit is +10. If the judge decides
the case incorrectly, the judge's benefit is 0-any positive utility from
making a decision is offset by the negative utility of getting it wrong. If
the case goes to trial, the judge's utility is reduced (because of the reduc-
tion in available leisure time) by 4 (i.e., the judge's benefit from the trial
is -4). I assume that the judge is risk neutral in evaluating how to decide
the case.
The case before the judge is one in which conducting discovery and
holding a trial increases the likelihood that the judge will get the right
result. I call such a case a fact-intensive case. Many, if not most, cases in
the real world benefit to some extent from such factual development.
Accordingly, if the trial judge decides the case before trial (on defend-
ant's dispositive motion), assume that there is a 0.5 likelihood that the
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judge will get the right result." 6 If the case proceeds to discovery and
trial, the trial judge has an 0.8 likelihood of getting the right result.
Given these values, how will the trial judge decide the case? The as-
sumption, again, is that the judge is trying to get the decision right, but
that doing so is costly to the judge in that it takes time-a scarce re-
source. If the trial judge grants the dispositive motion, there is a 0.5 like-
lihood that the decision will be correct (with a benefit of +10) and a 0.5
likelihood that the decision will be incorrect (with a benefit of 0). The
case will not go to trial (with a benefit of 0). On net, granting the motion
results in an expected benefit of 5 to the judge ((0.5*10) + (0.5*0) - 0 = 5).
If the trial judge denies the motion, the case proceeds to discovery and
trial. Conducting discovery and holding a trial increases the likelihood
that the judge will decide the case correctly(from 0.5 to 0.8), but at a cost
to the judge of less leisure time (a benefit of -4). On net, denying the
dispositive motion and proceeding with the case has an expected benefit
of only 4 to the judge ((0.8*10) + (0.2*0) - 4 = 4). The judge will therefore
grant the motion and find in favor of the defendant. The judge's prefer-
ence for leisure leads to the wrong result.
Investing more resources in improving the quality of trial judges will
not necessarily correct this result. The wrong decision is not a mistake by
the trial judge that could be prevented by greater skill, but is a result of
the judge's incentives. 117 Investing the resources instead in reducing the
judge's caseload might change the result. Reducing the caseload of the
judge might reduce the disutility to the judge of conducting a trial (from
-4 to -3 or -2), and thus change how the judge rules on the motion.
Another possibility is to appoint trial judges who prefer conducting tri-
als to other activities that they might do in their leisure time. In other
words, appoint trial judges who derive positive rather than negative util-
ity from holding trials. If, on these hypothetical facts, the trial judge re-
ceives a benefit of +2 from holding a trial rather than -4, the judge will
hold a trial and have a greater likelihood of reaching the correct result.
This solution has its own difficulties, however. First, it is costly to iden-
tify judges who prefer trials'1 8-although if nothing else there may be
some self-selection in that regard.119 Second, given the law of declining
marginal utility, it seems likely that at some point even trial judges who
116. Such a probability might result from the so-called "selection effect." See George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
5 (1984). But see Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, 25
J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1996) (challenging the selection effect theory and summarizing the
literature).
117. If greater skill enabled the judge to reduce the length of the trial, thus offsetting
the judge's negative utility derived from holding a trial, then increased skill might lead to a
different result.
118. See Rasmusen, supra note 33, at 67.
119. If a prospective judge strongly dislikes trials, that judge may well decline to be
considered for a district court appointment. Cf Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior,
supra note 40, at 188 n.13 (noting that some judges might "find the appeals court to be
quite isolating and prefer" to remain trial court judges).
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prefer trials will find holding a trial so costly in terms of their leisure time
that the utility derived from holding another trial will be negative. Third,
and perhaps most important, judges who prefer trials may end up holding
trials in cases in which trials are unnecessary. Take, for example, a law-
intensive (as opposed to a fact-intensive) case, a case in which a trial does
not increase the likelihood of a correct result. In such a case, whether the
trial judge grants a dispositive motion or decides the case after a trial, the
likelihood of a correct decision is 0.8. If holding a trial has a positive
utility for the judge (e.g., +2), the judge will proceed to trial even though
the trial is purely a waste of resources. If the judge grants the dispositive
motion, the expected benefit will be 0.8(10) + 0.2(0) - 0 = 8; if the judge
holds a trial, the expected benefit will be 0.8(10) + 0.2(0) + 2 = 10. The
parties will bear much of the cost of a trial and can control whether there
will be one by settling the case; thus they have an incentive to avoid a
trial and limit the scope of the problem. Nevertheless, this example
shows that merely selecting trial judges based on their preference for (or
dislike of) trials is not an ideal solution.
Indeed, what this analysis suggests is that the best decision-maker in
this illustration is one who has a slight (but only slight) aversion to the
case proceeding to trial. If the case is a fact-intensive one, such a judge
will decide that the case should proceed to trial. If the case is a law-
intensive one, the judge will decide the case on the law without a trial.
The preference must remain relatively constant, however, and it is un-
likely that even a trial judge with such preferences will satisfy that
requirement.
2. Appellate Judge Reviews Case on Appeal
Assume now that there is a single appellate judge who will review the
case on appeal. Assume also that this appellate judge has preferences
identical to those of the trial judge. As is the current American approach,
if the appellate judge reverses the grant of the dispositive motion, the
case will be remanded for further proceedings before the original trial
judge.120 Thus, the appellate judge does not bear the costs of conducting
a trial on remand-the trial judge bears those costs. Because the costs of
a trial are external to the appeals court judge, they do not figure into that
judge's decision whether to affirm or reverse. Instead, the main cost of
reversal and remand (as opposed to affirmance) to the appellate judge is
the possibility that one of the parties will appeal after the trial and the
appellate judge will need to consider the case again. Although that cost is
a real one, it presumably is far less significant than the cost of conducting
the trial on remand.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 31 F.3d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam);
United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1977). Cf. 7TH CIR. R. 36 ("Whenever a
case tried in a district court is remanded by this court for a new trial, it shall be reassigned
by the district court for trial before a judge other than the judge who heard the prior trial
.... ) (emphasis added).
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Thus, an appellate judge will receive some negative utility from revers-
ing a trial court's decision and remanding it for trial. But the negative
utility is likely to be less than that of the trial judge because the costs of
reversal to the appellate judge are far less than those facing the trial
judge. In addition, although the appellate judge's (dis)utility likely will
vary (as will the trial judge's), that variance will likely be far smaller than
that experienced by the trial judge. Thus, an appellate judge deciding the
case will be more like the "best" decision-maker described above than
will be the trial judge.
Assume now that there are two tiers of judges, one trial and one appel-
late. Both judges have identical preferences, which are the same as those
of the trial judge above. That is, both judges benefit by +10 for a correct
decision and 0 for an incorrect decision. Both judges have the same pref-
erences for work versus leisure, but the trial judge receives disutility of -4
from holding a trial while the appellate judge receives disutility from re-
versal of only -0.5 (from the possibility of a second appeal following trial
on remand). If this is a fact-intensive case, with a 0.5 probability of a
correct result if there is no trial and a 0.8 probability of a correct result
with a trial (and assuming for now that the trial judge does not consider
the possibility of reversal), the trial judge will erroneously grant defend-
ant's dispositive motion as explained above.
How will the appellate judge, with identical preferences to the trial
judge, decide the case? The appellate judge will reverse the trial court's
grant of a dispositive motion and remand the case for trial. If the appeals
judge affirms, there will be a 0.5 probability that the result is correct, and
the judge will receive no negative utility from remand: 0.5(10) + 0.5(0) -0
= 5. If the appeals judge reverses, the trial court will proceed to trial,
there will be a 0.8 probability of a correct result, and the appellate judge's
utility is reduced by 0.5 due to the possibility of an appeal following re-
mand: 0.8(10) + 0.2(0) - 0.5 = 7.5. Accordingly, the appeals judge will
reverse the trial court's decision and remand the case for trial. In this
simple example, the presence of an appeals process results in a "mistake"
or "error" of the trial court being corrected by reversal on appeal. Be-
cause the appeals judge has different incentives than the trial judge (even
with identical preferences), that judge decides the case correctly.
Further, the presence of an appeals process may alter the initial deci-
sion by the trial judge and make an appeal unnecessary. With an appeals
process (and the possibility of reversal), the trial judge now faces the pos-
sibility that the appeals court will reverse the grant of a dispositive mo-
tion and the trial judge will have to hold a trial anyway. Although
granting the motion may increase the trial judge's leisure in the short
term, the trial judge may nonetheless incur the negative utility of the trial
in the long term. Because the negative utility will be incurred at some
point in the future, it will be discounted both by the probability of rever-
sal and by some "discount rate" for the delay before trial is held (a trial
next year is less costly than a trial today). The probability of reversal will
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be inversely related to the likelihood the trial court's decision is correct:
the greater the likelihood of a correct decision, the less likely it is that the
appeals court will reverse.
Assume that the negative utility of a trial on remand is -3 and that
there is a probability of 0.5 that the appeals court will reverse the grant of
the dispositive motion.121 Taking the same trial court preferences as
before, if the trial court denies the motion and the case proceeds to trial,
the trial judge's expected benefit is (0.8*10) + (0.2*0) - 4 = 4; if the trial
court grants the motion, then the expected benefit is (0.5*10) + (0.5*0) -
(0.5 *3) = 3.5. The trial court will deny the motion and go to trial, which
is the correct result, but one that would not have happened without an
appeals process.
Note again that this result does not require that the trial judge be re-
versal averse-i.e., that the judge receive negative utility from the rever-
sal itself. Indeed, the trial judge may recognize that the reversal is no
reflection on the judge's abilities, and yet still decide the case differently
than the judge would without an appeals process. The key is that the
appeals process requires the trial judge to consider the possibility of hav-
ing to hold a trial in the event the appeals court reverses the grant of the
dispositive motion.
B. VARIATIONS IN THE APPEALS PROCESS
This section extends the basic analysis by examining briefly how three
variations in the appeals process would affect judicial incentives. The
three variations analyzed are (1) eliminating or restricting the appeals
process; (2) expanding review of factual issues by appellate courts; and
(3) creating asymmetric rights of appeal whereby one party but not the
other may appeal. The analysis that follows is largely a positive one (or at
least it attempts to be)-predicting the likely effect of the variation dis-
cussed. Nonetheless, the results may be of normative interest as well,
because the effect on judicial incentives presumably will be relevant to
whether such a variation is desirable. 122
121. For purposes of this simple model, I assume that if the trial judge holds a trial, the
appeals court may affirm or reverse the judgment but will not remand the case for a new
trial.
122. An overall normative evaluation is difficult because the marginal costs and bene-
fits facing the participants in dispute resolution (including the judges) do not necessarily
coincide with the marginal costs and benefits to society of a particular resolution of any
dispute. See Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly
Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982); see also Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social
Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 1. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1986); Peter S. Menell, A Note on Private
Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1983);
Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private In-
centives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 483
(1987). See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); TULLOCK, supra note 36, at 123-25.
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1. Eliminating or Restricting the Appeals Process
The United States Constitution does not guarantee the right to ap-
peal. 123 As a result, in theory at least, Congress can eliminate the appeals
process across the board or in certain categories of cases.124 In recent
years, a variety of commentators, 25 including a number of federal
judges, 26 have considered or advocated the desirability of eliminating or
restricting the appeals process.
Analyzing the effect on judicial incentives of eliminating the appeals
process altogether is relatively straightforward. The sole decision-
maker-the trial court-would decide both the legal and the factual is-
sues in a case. The parties would no longer have the option to seek re-
view by a court with different incentives than the trial court. Nor would
the trial court have to consider the possibility of appellate review in mak-
ing its decisions in the first instance. Thus, one would expect that leisure
would become a more important factor in trial court decisions in the ab-
sence of an appeals process. In addition, judges who took precautions
against reversal because they were reversal-averse would reduce their
level of precautions. Finally, one of the advantages to the judge of settle-
ment over dismissal would disappear-currently, settlements are a "supe-
rior, low-cost alternative" to dismissal because they generally are not
subject to review on appeal. 127 As a result, one would expect judges to
substitute dismissals on the merits for facilitated settlements. If appeals
were eliminated only in certain types of cases, those cases would be the
ones in which these effects would occur.
If the appeals process were eliminated altogether, trial court judges
would have substantially reduced opportunities for promotion within the
judiciary because there would be no appellate judgeships. As a result,
one would expect the influence of that element of the judicial utility func-
tion largely to disappear. Eliminating appeals only in selected types of
cases would not affect judicial preferences for promotion unless the
number of appellate judgeships were reduced as well.
123. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 656 (1977). Indeed, criminal defendants had no statutory right to appeal until 1889.
See Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655.
124. Restrictions on the right to appeal would, of course, be subject to other constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Due Process clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g.,
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996).
125. See TULLOCK, supra note 36, at 163-66; GoRoN TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE
LAw 203-08 (2d ed. 1987); Martha J. Dragich, Once A Century: Time for a Structural Over-
haul of the Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 11, 52 (discretionary appeals); Dalton, supra
note 113, at 95-107; Judith Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1028-30 (1984); Irving
Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are They Useful in the Administration of Justice?, 56 GEO. L.J. 417
(1968).
126. See Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for
Adopting Discretionary Review in the Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. REV. 573
(1997); Donald P. Lay, The Federal Appeals Process: Whither We Goest? The Next Fifty
Years, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515, 532-33 (1989); Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Dis-
cretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151 (1981).
127. Macey, supra note 34, at 634.
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If, as some have proposed, review by the United States courts of ap-
peals were made discretionary rather than a matter of right,128 the con-
straining effect of the appeals process would still decline, although not so
dramatically. Much would depend on the frequency with which courts of
appeals reviewed (or declined to review) cases: if appellate review be-
came relatively rare, the effect on judicial incentives would be more like
the effect of eliminating the appeals process altogether.
129
2. Expanding Review of Factual Issues by Appellate Courts
Appellate courts generally defer to the findings of fact in the trial
court. 130 In the United States, the Seventh Amendment protects jury
fact-finding from court (including appellate court) interference. 31 In
cases in which the trial court itself is the fact finder, appellate courts like-
wise defer to the trial court's findings of fact. 132 By contrast, review of
legal issues is always de novo.133
Gordon Tullock has questioned this differing treatment of factual and
legal issues. He contends that "[i]f we are going to have an appellate
procedure, however, and we do think that it improves the quality of 'jus-
tice,' then there does not seem to be very much argument for not al-
lowing appeals on every aspect of the case," including factual issues.
134
More generally, Lewis Kornhauser faults "agency models of adjudica-
tion" that "focus on the conflicting interests among judges to explain the
existence of hierarchy," for not "explain[ing] the specialization of trial
courts in fact-finding."' 35
This Article suggests a reason for deferential factual review at the ap-
pellate court level: its effect on the incentives of the appellate judge. 136
128. Some have contended that, in practice, the courts of appeals already exercise dis-
cretionary review. See, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expedi-
ency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 273, 293-94 (1996).
129. It may be that the United States Supreme Court currently reviews so few cases
from the courts of appeals that the risk of reversal by the Court provides little constraint
on courts of appeals judges. See Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra
note 10, at 14-15.
130. At least in common law countries they do. Civil law countries are somewhat dif-
ferent. See infra note 137.
131. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII ("no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law").
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("clearly erroneous" standard of review). Indeed, when
Congress first permitted bench trials, it provided for trial court findings of fact to receive
the same deference as those made by juries. See Act of March 3, 1865, § 4, ch. 86, 13 Stat.
501 ("The finding of the court upon the facts, which may be either general or special, shall
have the same effect as the verdict of a jury.").
133. See, e.g., Sward, supra note 55, at 9-10.
134. TULLOCK, supra note 36, at 166-67; see TULLOCK, supra note 125, at 202.
135. Kornhauser, supra note 76, at 1609-11. The divergence in incentives between trial
courts and appellate courts might be characterized as a form of "agency cost." See Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976).
136. There may be other reasons for deferential review, at least of certain types of fac-
tual issues, such as the inability of appellate judges to view the demeanor of witnesses. See
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The greater the factual review by an appeals judge, the more the appeals
judge's incentives become like those of a trial judge, at least as to the
judge's preference for leisure. Currently, an appellate judge engages only
in limited factual review and the costs of any fact-finding on remand are
external to the appeals judge's decision-making. If appellate courts were
to conduct de novo trials of cases on appeal, the appellate judge would
have much the same incentives with respect to leisure as trial court
judges. Expanding factual review in less extensive ways-such as permit-
ting new evidence to be introduced on appeal137-would have lesser in-
centive effects, but these effects would still be in the direction of reducing
the differences between trial judges and appeals judges.138
3. Creating Asymmetric Rights to Appeal
The right to appeal in criminal cases in the United States is "asymmet-
rical." If the defendant is convicted, he or she has the right to appeal the
conviction. If the defendant is acquitted, however, because of double
jeopardy considerations the government does not have an equivalent
right to appeal. 139 Kate Stith argues that if a trial court judge "seeks to
avoid reversal, the prohibition on government appeal of acquittals pro-
vides an incentive to make pro-defendant errors.' 140 This Article sug-
gests that such an incentive exists even if the judge is not reversal averse.
A rational trial court judge would consider the asymmetrical risk of re-
versal and retrial in making decisions in criminal cases. Deciding in favor
of the government is more costly, all else being equal, because there is a
risk that the decision will be reversed and the court will have to try the
case (or try it again). Deciding in favor of the defendant does not have
that same cost. Accordingly, one would expect trial court decisions on
the margin to favor criminal defendants.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 10, § 21.14, at 584-85; TULLOCK, supra
note 125, at 202; Sward, supra note 55, at 9-10.
137. Civil law systems provide for greater review of factual issues by appellate courts.
See Herzog & Karlen, supra note 2, § 8-62. A possible explanation for this difference from
common law systems may be that civil law systems rely less on the parties and more on the
trial court judge to develop the facts. Trial court judges in such an inquisitorial system are
not passive observers but are fact developers, which, along with the bureaucratic nature of
civil law judiciaries, may give them different incentives than common law trial court judges
and make expanded factual review by appeals courts likely. See also TULLOCK, supra note
36, at 125-26 (discussing incentives of judges in civil law system).
138. Some review of fact findings by appellate courts would seem to be useful. Other-
wise, trial courts would have the incentive to avoid appellate review of their decisions by
making incorrect fact findings. Or trial courts might decide factual issues so as to reach
legal issues that "correct" fact findings would not present. Retaining some appellate over-
sight of factual issues limits these incentives. In addition, the right to jury trial gives a party
the right to select a jury as a fact-finder if it believes the case might be one of this sort.
139. See U.S. CONST. amend V; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-97 (1969); Kep-
ner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126 (1904). In extraordinary cases, the government
might be able to seek review by writ of mandamus. See FED. R. App. P. 21.
140. Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 36 (1990).
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IV. JUDICIAL (AND ARBITRAL) INCENTIVES AND
THE LACK OF AN APPEALS PROCESS IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
This Article has focused on the function of an appeals process in an
independent judiciary. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to discuss at least
briefly the most prominent anomaly in the otherwise widespread availa-
bility of an appeals process-the lack of an appeals process in most com-
mercial arbitration proceedings. 141  The rules of the American
Arbitration Association and the leading international arbitration institu-
tions do not provide for an appeals process; the award of the arbitrator is
final. 142 Further, with few exceptions, treaties and statutes that authorize
court action to enforce or vacate arbitration awards carefully circum-
scribe the grounds on which courts can second guess the decisions of
arbitrators. 143
As noted above, the widespread presence of an appeals process in
court adjudication, and the lack of one in commercial arbitration, lead
Landes and Posner to conclude that lawmaking is the main function of
appellate proceedings. 144 There is no right of appeal in arbitration be-
cause the parties do not find it worth their while to pay for a lawmaking
function that largely benefits others.'4 5 Shavell explains the lack of an
appeals process in arbitration as based, not only on the fact that arbitra-
tors do not make "law," but also on (1) the parties' ability to "choose an
arbitrator who is knowledgeable about the issue in dispute and who is
known for the soundness of his past decisions," and (2) the arbitrators'
''economic interest in not making errors and in maintaining their
reputation."'146
141. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
342 (1993); Shavell, supra note 5, at 423.
142. See American Arbitration Ass'n, Commercial Arbitration Rules §§ 42 & 43;
American Arbitration Ass'n, International Arbitration Rules, art. 27; International Cham-
ber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration art. 28(6) (effective Jan. 1, 1998). Under the ICC
Rules, the ICC International Court of Arbitration is to review arbitration awards before
they are issued "as to the form of the Award," although "without affecting the Arbitral
Tribunal's liberty of decision," the Court may also "draw its attention to points of sub-
stance." Id. art. 27; see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 13 & n. 57 (1994) ("[tlhe Court's review is in theory non-substan-
tive, but has sometimes been viewed as touching on the merits of the decision.").
143. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958 art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; 9 U.S.C. § 10
(1994); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 12; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration, art. 36, U.N. doc. A/40/17 annex 1 (1985); ToM CARBONNEAU, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8 (1997) ("courts rarely vacate arbitra-
tion awards"). See generally IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., IV FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW
§ 40 (1995) (addressing grounds for vacating arbitration awards).
144. See Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 235.
145. Landes and Posner note that rule production by arbitrators benefits both future
parties and competing judges, benefits for which the arbitrator is not compensated. See id.
at 238. But see Christopher J. Bruce, The Adjudication of Labor Disputes as a Private
Good, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 7-10 (1988) (concluding that "a private arbitration sys-
tem is able to produce consistent, precedential rulings").
146. Shavell, supra note 5, at 423-24.
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The focus here on judicial incentives suggests an additional reason for
the lack of an appeals process in commercial arbitration. As Shavell
notes, the incentives of arbitrators differ from the incentives of trial court
judges. Robert Cooter points out that "private judges have to attract
business, so they are exposed to the same market pressures as anyone
who sells a service."'1 47 Because of this economic incentive, Cooter ar-
gues, "income-maximizing private judges make decisions which are
Pareto efficient with respect to the litigants (pair-wise efficient). ' 148 Trial
court judges have no similar incentive. Their pay is the same regardless
of how they decide cases. 149
This economic incentive may reduce the likelihood that arbitrators will
make mistakes, as Shavell contends. 150 But in addition, it reduces the
role played by various elements of the judicial utility function-in partic-
ular leisure. Indeed, arbitrators generally get paid more the longer they
spend on a case. 151 If anything, their incentive is to spend too much time
on a case rather than too little. An appeals process would do little to
control this incentive problem. Instead, the market provides the neces-
sary constraint because an arbitrator who spends too much time on a case
is less likely to be hired as an arbitrator in the future. Because the mar-
ket constrains an arbitrator's incentives in a way that it does not constrain
federal judges, an appeals process is not worth what it would cost the
parties to provide. 152
147. Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE
107, 107 (1983); see also TULLOCK, supra note 36, at 122, 127-33; Robert D. Cooter &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 533, 545
(1990).
148. Cooter, supra note 147, at 107. As Gordon Tullock points out, however, if "one of
the parties to future contracts is apt to hold superior information [about the previous deci-
sions of an arbitrator], it may lead to a very strong element of bias on the part of the
arbitrator." TULLOCK, supra note 36, at 127; see also Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private
Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 521-29 (1997).
149. Cooter posits that trial judges may seek to reach the same decision in a case as an
arbitrator in order to increase their prestige in the legal community; lawyers would want
trial judges who behaved in that fashion to decide their cases even though the lawyers
would not have that choice. See Cooter, supra note 147, at 128-30. That view is plausible
as far as it goes, and the ability of parties in California to use a peremptory challenge to
"veto" a judge may make judicial incentives more like those of arbitrators. See CAL. CiV.
PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997). But the point here is that the judicial
utility function is not so simple and that the economic incentives of arbitrators are different
than those of trial court judges.
150. See Shavell, supra note 5, at 423-24.
151. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(detailing arbitrators' hourly rates). But see Eric A. Schwartz, The ICC Arbitral Process
Part IV: The Costs of ICC Arbitrations, 4 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 8, 10 (1993) (ICC,
unlike many arbitration institutions, sets fees in accord with published fee schedule).
152. Some arbitration rules, particularly those promulgated by commodities trade orga-
nizations, do provide for appeals tribunals. Interestingly, those rules generally provide for
de novo hearings in which the appellate panel rehears the case in its entirety. See DEREK
KIRBY JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ARBITRATION (1991). The problem de-
serves more study, but Johnson suggests that "the theory of two-tier systems is that the first
arbitration should be fairly quick, and that an appeal is an opportunity for rather deeper




Not all trial court "errors" are mistakes.153 At least some are the result
of differing incentives facing judges at different tiers of the court sys-
tem. 154 A judge's preferences for leisure and promotion, for example,
will be less important in judicial decision-making, all else being equal, at
the appellate level than at the trial court level. An appeals process per-
mits parties to have their case reviewed by a court with different incen-
tives than the trial judge, and ensures that the trial judge considers that
possibility in deciding the case. As a result, the appeals process prevents
some such "errors;" others will be corrected by the appellate court. An
appeals process does more than correct cognitive mistakes by trial court
judges; it changes the trial judge's incentives.
Arbitrators, by comparison, have very different incentives than trial
judges. Unlike judges, the compensation of arbitrators varies with the
amount of time they spend on a case, and arbitrators compete with each
other for future cases. Market forces constrain the self-interest of arbitra-
tors in ways that they do not for judges, making an appeals process of less
value to the disputing parties in an arbitration proceeding. The differing
incentives of judges and arbitrators thus provide an additional, incen-
tives-based explanation for the lack of an appeals process in commercial
arbitration.
153. See Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II, The Unjoined Debate, in THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 341, 345-
47 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995) (identifying "public-policy
processes in which 'mistake' theories eventually gave way to explanations based on ra-
tional, self-interest-seeking political behavior").
154. That would also explain why not all errors are corrected at trial, a question that
troubles Shavell. See Shavell, supra note 5, at 413-15.
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